Urban development and cooperation games by Eika, Anders
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjpr20
Journal of Property Research
ISSN: 0959-9916 (Print) 1466-4453 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjpr20
Urban development and cooperation games
Anders Eika
To cite this article: Anders Eika (2019) Urban development and cooperation games, Journal of
Property Research, 36:3, 291-311, DOI: 10.1080/09599916.2019.1615977
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09599916.2019.1615977
© 2019 Norwegian University of Life
Sciences. Published by Informa UK Limited,
trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
Published online: 20 May 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 232
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Urban development and cooperation games
Anders Eika
Department of Landscape and Society, Norwegian University of Life Science, Ås, Norway
ABSTRACT
This paper investigates what makes developers and municipal
planning authorities more (or less) likely to cooperate. It borrows
methods from behavioural economics for eliciting the propensity
of cooperation in diﬀerent groups under diﬀerent circumstances.
Participants from private development companies, public plan-
ning, and related ﬁelds have played simple games in which they
chose whether to cooperate in an urban transformation scenario
(N = 269). By altering minor details, we learn about what makes
people cooperate. The paper is able to quantify some human
biases aﬀecting the actions we observe in development projects:
The ﬁndings indicate that people tend to be more cooperative
towards people from the same sector, are less likely to cooperate
in riskier scenarios, and in situations where some group members
have fewer resources to contribute to the cooperative eﬀort.
Hopefully, the novelty of using economic experiments on planning
and property development decision making could serve as an
inspiration for other researchers in the ﬁeld, although the metho-
dology does carry limited external validity.
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Introduction
Most urban development is dependent on diﬀerent actors working alongside one another.
While the systems for spatial development diﬀer from project to project, within countries,
and between countries, they virtually always involve a public planning authority, and an
entity that wants to develop land. The planning authority maintains public interests and
allows or disallows projects according to some rules, plans, and guidelines. The developer
may be a public, commercial, or private person who wants to build something to use, or
a developer that wants to build something for commercial sale or lease.
This paper will focus on these two primary groups: The planners and the developers,
and their attitudes towards cooperating. While these two groups have diﬀerent goals
and tools, they need each other (Peiser, 1990). Without private and public development
projects it is hard to imagine how the economy would avoid stagnation, while a certain
planning and regulation is necessary to avoid rampant ineﬃciency (Webster, 1998).
In many complex development projects, typically redevelopment within the existing
city, planners have to deal with multiple developers working in the same area (Barlindhaug
& Nordahl, 2018). The diﬀerent projects will connect to, and beneﬁt from, the same
infrastructure and public spaces. Because these goods are diﬃcult to exclude users from,
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and one developer’s use of these goods does not noticeably diminish the beneﬁt other
developers and users get from the improvement, developers will have an incentive to
freeride (DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1996). In other words, each individual developer will
reach higher proﬁts the more others pay to provide the goods, while they contribute as little
as possible. One common strategy to do this is to delay development until all other public
and private projects in the area are ﬁnished, and the infrastructure and public spaces are
already in place. This can cause a standstill in a development area, particularly in brown-
ﬁelds where margins are small and signiﬁcant improvements must be created (Melo &
Cruz, 2017). When planning such non-excludable, non-rivalrous goods (in economics
called public goods), the diﬀerent actors can gain much by coordinating their respective
projects, to maximise the beneﬁts from these investments and avoid an environment where
everyone tries to freeride (Klosterman, 1985). This paper therefore seeks to study coopera-
tion both between planners and developers, and among developers.
‘Cooperation’ can here be any number of diﬀerent activities, depending on the setting
and actors in question: Among diﬀerent public or private actors, between these groups, or
with NGOs and civil society. Rather than looking at speciﬁc forms of cooperation and
evaluating certain outcomes as good and others as bad, this paper focuses on any type of
cooperation where public and/or private actors can work together for mutual beneﬁt, but
where working alone also is a viable option. In some situations, the decision of whether and
how to cooperate will be a pure cost-beneﬁt analysis. Some of the costs and beneﬁts are,
however, diﬃcult to quantify, so the actors will have to depend more on ‘gut feelings’ and
heuristics to decide (Rand et al., 2014). A good climate of cooperation implies an environ-
ment in which these biases push people towards cooperation in situations where costs and
beneﬁts of cooperating are diﬃcult to calculate (Rand et al., 2014).
Scholars of many ﬁelds have created a rich body of literature looking into such attempts
at freeriding and cooperation between humans. They try to answer questions such as: Why
humans sometimes are able to cooperate even when it might be better for an individual to
freeride; how to deﬁne group boundaries to sustain cooperation (Ostrom, 1990); why
humans often feel bad about defecting from a cooperation scheme; or why one would be
willing to pay to punish such defectors even when the signalling eﬀect is eliminated (Fehr &
Gachter, 2000). One important tool used to answer questions along these lines are eco-
nomic experiments, where researchers study how human actions deviate from economic
theory under controlled circumstances. As a ﬁeld withmultiple actors working besides each
other in a network of diﬀerent relationships, it is plausible that there is an underutilised
potential for applying this methodology to urban development scenarios. Economic experi-
ments are a viable tool for testing potential policies in various ﬁelds (Plott, 1987). This paper
should be seen as a step towards doing the same in policymaking for market-based
provisions of public goods in urban development by providing a methodological and
theoretical framework.
To summarise this introduction, planners and developers are linked together (Peiser,
1990). Their goals are not fully aligned and they can see each other as opponents or
collaborators, or, most likely, somewhere between these two, and there are beneﬁts to
seeing each other as collaborators (Codecasa & Ponzini, 2011). In the construction phase of
the development, a good climate of cooperation between the actors can be more important
than the climate within each ﬁrm, as disagreements with other actors can greatly disrupt
their operations (Phua & Rowlinson, 2004).
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The paper use economic experiments with planners, developers, and other people
involved in urban development to gauge the climate of cooperation, and try to identify
potential threats to it. More speciﬁcally, the paper tests the following hypotheses:
● Subjects are inclined to cooperate in a hypothetical development setting, even
when it is individually suboptimal and payoﬀs are uncertain.
● Subjects will cooperate less in groups with people from diﬀerent employment
sectors.
● Subjects will cooperate less when faced with heterogeneous power levels within the
group.
The ﬁrst section further introduces the concept of cooperating for public goods in planning,
describes the Norwegian planning system as the context for the games, and relates the topic
to planning in general. Section two gives a brief overview of the literature of cooperation
games. Section three describes and report from the experiments, and section four discusses
what these ﬁndings imply for the dynamics of cooperative urban development.
Background
Brownﬁelds and planning
One of the main reasons society regulates urban development, as opposed to all developers
building only as the market dictates, is to make sure goods such as roads and parks are
provided andmade accessible for surrounding landowners and residents (Wong, Chan,&Yu,
2011). Thus, also libertarians recognise the importance of planning (Lai, 2002). In making
these non-rivalrous goods non-excludable, they become prone to the pitfalls of traditional
public goods, particularly under-provision (Alfano & Marwell, 1980). Proﬁt-maximising
developers will not want to spend more on public goods than what is necessary. The most
common way to solve this problem is to let the public, usually represented by the munici-
pality, provide most of these public goods. They can then recapture part of the added value
from those that beneﬁt from it through any one of a number of methods (Alterman, 2012).
If we imagine that we removed all public planning, how would housing projects be?
They might still include some public areas if it is beneﬁcial to forgo some units to increase
the value of the others (Weigher & Zerbst, 1973). Greenery, for instance, can increase
property values by 7–10 % in urban areas where vegetation is severely lacking, aﬀecting
prices of units more than a hundred meters away (Mei, Zhao, Lin, & Gao, 2018). In these
cases, a proﬁt-maximising developer will shape and dimension land uses to maximise the
value added to their project, disregarding surrounding plots. This results in small public
spaces in the centre of the projects, with minimal access to the people who are not residents.
As developers do not receive the entire beneﬁt from investing in aesthetic constructions,
but pay the entire cost, they will also have an incentive to build less aesthetically than the
social optimum where marginal costs equals marginal utility for the entire area.
Theoretically, in an environment with several developers facing the decision of how
much to invest in providing these public goods, it is easy to see that they would all be
better oﬀ if each of them were willing to pay for more than what gives the largest proﬁt
for the individual: This is a version of the prisoners’ dilemma, in which multiple actors
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choosing an individually sound strategy leads to an outcome that is worse for everyone,
than if all actors would chose the less optimal strategy of cooperation.
In praxis, this will often happen. In situations where each individual developer would
be better oﬀ by freeriding on other actors’ public goods, they often refrain from doing
so (Klosterman, 1985). This does not necessarily have to be only from the kindness of
their hearts, but rather than there are certain incalculable beneﬁts from assisting in the
provision of public goods, and incalculable costs to freeriding. The greater preference
someone has for contributing to public goods, the more likely they are to cooperate,
ceteris paribus (Rand et al., 2014). So, which circumstances make the shapers of urban
space pay for public goods beyond their individual preference when deciding how to
invest?
One of the main selling points of channelling growth into redevelopment areas such
as industrial- and logistics areas is to remove problems from the urban environment.
These areas tend to cause air-, noise-, and visual pollution, which reduce the value of
surrounding land for residential or commercial uses. By transforming them, they create
urban areas that provide the surrounding areas with public goods, both by diminishing
these negative eﬀects and by adding public spaces, improved infrastructure, and service
providers. Redevelopment aﬀects more users and developers than scattered greenﬁeld
projects.
Planning systems and role divisions
In other words, as municipalities turn to urban redevelopment to accommodate growth,
cooperating for public goods becomes more important. Diﬀerent systems for planning and
development will have diﬀerent parameters for cooperation and the provision of public
goods. In Norway, development is heavily dependent on private developers and the
municipalities working alongside one another. The municipalities make superior plans
for the development or conservation of all land within their borders. They also often
supplement these with narrower thematic plans, such as for bike path networks or surface
runoﬀ management plans. In the main development and transformation areas, local
authorities usually also make superior juridical binding zoning. The developers forward
the detailed zoning plans for their projects (Falleth &Nordahl, 2017). Themunicipality will
then approve or disapprove the proposal based on whether it ﬁts into their own visions for
the area and comply with the statutory plans.While the developer is preparing their zoning
plans, they liaison with the municipality’s planning department, who will inform them of
what they must do to get their proposals approved. Depending on how strongly these two
actors want to see the project completed, these requirements might diﬀer: In areas where
development land is in short supply and prices are high, developers will be willing and able
to go a long way towards meeting any of the municipality’s requirements. In areas where
investments in development are hard to come by, the municipality will have to be less
demanding or the developer will go elsewhere (Nordahl, 2006).
This is a type of public-private partnership, and as such, disagreements between the
parties are prone to hamper the development eﬀort (Glumac, Han, & Schaefer, 2013).
For instance, information gaps causing asymmetric uncertainty (Thomas, 2003) or
conﬂicting interests (Blokhuis, Snijders, Han, & Schaefer, 2012) are plausible sources
of disagreements. Theory on the negotiations in public-private partnerships, as those
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found in Norwegian property development, straddle both the normative and prescrip-
tive approach, which warrants studying it through cooperation games (Glumac, Han, &
Schaefer, 2016).
In the negotiations betweenNorwegian developers andmunicipalities, public goods such
as parks are often an important topic. The developer will usually want to internalise the
beneﬁts from these investments as much as possible, by making them exclusive to the end
users, while the municipality wants them to beneﬁt the public as a whole (Webster, 1998).
They will also disagree on the levels of investments: For instance, interior roads and
walkways are necessary to build any multi-unit project, and will be a task of the developer
by legal requirement linked to planning permission. Investments above this minimum will
beneﬁt the local area as awhole. Reduced congestion frombetter roads ripple out andpeople
from a large catchment area utilise high-quality public spaces. Municipalities, in trying to
maximise these expenses, bring these investments closer to the social optimum where
marginal costs meet marginal beneﬁts for the entire city. Planners are prone to see it as
wresting power and resources from the wealthy and powerful, and give it to society and the
disenfranchised. Developers, on the other hand, can see this as a fair and necessary part of
development, or as extortion by greedymunicipalities (Osborn, 1989). Often, they aremore
negative to the unpredictability of the municipality’s demands and additions of require-
ments late in the process, which alters its ﬁnancial boundaries, than the actual levels
(Nordahl, Barlindhaug, & Ruud, 2008).
Common interests
Despite this adversarial relationship among the various developers and between themand the
municipality, their common interests are strong (Svensson, Klofsten, & Etzkowitz, 2012).
They all have a general interest inmaking good neighbourhoods, for any deﬁnition of ‘good’.
Good areas fetch higher prices. Municipalities both have a direct interest in making neigh-
bourhoods nice for their citizens, and can gather more tax from end users. Municipalities,
like the developers, have an interest in seeing transformation projects completed quickly as it
removes less desirable land uses from the urban fabric and improves housing supply.
A recent Norwegian survey found that public planners and private developers see each
other as moderately willing to cooperate (Ulstein, Ruge, Dombu, & Olsen, 2018).
In areas with multiple developers active at the same time, this problem of public goods
is the same: Each developer has an interest in the other developers investing heavily in
public goods and opening their spaces to the general population. This beneﬁt could be in
the form of higher prices, but also reduced demands from the municipality to furnish
common spaces for themselves, freeing up land for more lucrative uses. Developers in
Norway do not have any formal tools to ensure that others provide these public goods,
but depend on the municipality to ensure a fair distribution of costs (Sager, 2011). They
can occasionally ensure higher contributions through legally binding bilateral agreements
with other developers, although this is not common (Klosterman, 1985).
Cooperation experiments
Much intrinsic knowledge and ‘gut feelings’ goes into human decision-making, and gut
feelings are based on predictable heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Real estate
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scholars investigate for instance how heuristics cause risk (Woﬀord, Troilo, & Dorchester,
2010), aﬀect risk perceptions (Dittmann, 2014), which in turn aﬀect housing prices
(Freybote & Fruits, 2015), and which settings push decision makers to lean on heuristics
(Klamer, Bakker, & Gruis, 2018). While heuristics are often reasonable and can lead to
better outcomes when decision makers face uncertainty, they will occasionally lead to
solutions that are suboptimal at an individual or social level: As subconscious biases, they
will inﬂuence decisions independently of applicability in a given situation.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd clear empirical evidence on what makes people cooperate beyond
cost-beneﬁt analyses: Looking at actual cooperation invariably brings in a plethora of
case-speciﬁc variables regarding who are cooperating, about what, and under which
circumstances. By simplifying ‘willingness to cooperate’ to ‘propensity to contribute to
public goods’, public good game experiments used in behavioural economics and -
psychology can illicit information about what makes humans more likely to cooperate
on providing public goods. This methodology also helps separate actual motivators
from the subjects’ perceptions of their own motivators, which might be quite diﬀerent
(Adams, Disberry, Hutchison, & Munjoma, 2001).
Public goods games appear in many variants. They vary in design and complexity, but
they share a few deﬁning traits: More than one player must decide on a strategy. The
strategies that are good for each individual are bad for the group as a whole, and everyone is
better oﬀ if everyone choses strategies that are good for the group than if everyone choses
strategies that are good for themselves. Out of these principles, we can design any number
of games (for an overview, see Ledyard, 1994).
Ledyard also describes a ‘minimalist’ version: A number of players greater than two has
an equal number of something valuable, such as points or coins. In an experiment setting,
the experimenter endows these. The players chose to pay an integer of this to provide
a public good. The value of the public good is double the sum of all contributions, and is
divided equally between all players. The payoﬀ for each player is then whatever they did not
contribute to the public good, plus twice the sum of all contributions divided by the number
of players. A perfectly rational actor playing this game would contribute nothing, as each
unit contributed to the common pool gives two units divided by the number of players back
to the actor, independently of the contributions of the other players. None of the players
can get better oﬀ by contributing something, without also having a way to ensure that other
players also contributes something. Formally, this means that the Nash equilibrium is for
everyone to contributing nothing. This Nash equilibrium is, however, Pareto ineﬃcient, as
all players would be better oﬀ if they all contribute everything: each would then receive
twice their initial endowment. This is thus a version of the famous prisoner’s dilemma.
Real people, however, do not necessarily choose this strategy when the social and
individual optimum clashes, neither in real-life situations (Ostrom, 1990) nor in games
(Ledyard, 1994). In one-shot versions of the game, subjects tend to contribute between
40 and 60 percent of their endowment to the public good (Ostrom, 2000). There is no
complete explanation for why people do this, but it is partially contributed to impure
altruism: the simple notion that humans tend to feel good when contributing to other
people’s wellbeing, the so-called ‘warm glow’ (Andreoni, 1990). This ‘irrational’ bias is
an important contributor to keeping society together, as the cost of constantly having to
monitor the provision of public goods would make many of them unattainable.
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Heterogeneity
These experiments ﬁnd that many diﬀerent factors can inﬂuence contribution levels, such
as the framing of the game, how the groups are formed, or how much the subjects think
their opponents will contribute. One such venue of research is the heterogeneity of the
subjects: Do groups with some shared characteristics contribute more to public goods?
Altruistic cooperation such as contributing to common-pool resources in situation where
freeriding would get you more resources, most likely originated through evolutionary
preference of the individual’s own genes (Henrich & Henrich, 2007). This implies that
humans have certain positive biases towards people similarities to themselves, any trait that
can contribute to making a person feel kinship to another would increase contributions
(Alvard, 2009). Orbell, Van de Kragt, and Dawes (1988) investigated the eﬀect of allowing
discussions in the groups, and found that contributions were higher in groups that received
the non-discussion treatment if they believed they contributed money to other members of
the same treatment group than those playing the game in a diﬀerent room. The experi-
mental ﬁndings, however, are not unanimous. Dawes, McTavish, and Shaklee (1977) found
that people were just as likely to defect in an 8-player prisoner’s dilemma if the players had
been talking together for 10 min about unrelated things, than if they had not been
communicating at all. Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993) did a similar experiment with
particular attention to the subjects’ genders. They noticed that females contributed more if
they had been socialising a few minutes with the other subjects than in completely
anonymous groups. Men contributed the same independently of this treatment, and
more than women contribute in either case. Repeating the games, however, reduced this
eﬀect, and it was in neither case statistically signiﬁcant.
Urban development projects put heterogeneous groups together to provide public
goods. It is important that perceived diﬀerences between the individuals do not hinder
good cooperative eﬀorts (Turok & Bailey, 2004). If diﬀerences between people make them
less likely to cooperate with each other, the perceived heterogeneity of the diﬀerent actors
involved in urban redevelopment could decrease the propensity for cooperation.
Power balance
Development companies vary greatly in size and have constantly ﬂuctuating ﬁnancial
boundaries, and their power relative to the development authorities diﬀer: in dense,
urban municipalities in post-industrial economies, building rights are in great demand
and willing capital is abundant, while the opposite often is the case in rural munici-
palities and small towns. Moreover, the beneﬁt from the public good does not necessa-
rily create any immediate resources for all beneﬁciaries that they can use to justify
contributing to the good: If a landowner is not currently in the process of developing,
an increased development potential does not directly beneﬁt them. Most people have
a disinclination for cooperating on providing a public good with people that contribute
little to the good, so this could be a potential hindrance for cooperation (Carpenter,
2007). Many experiments focus on the eﬀect of heterogeneous power relationships
among the actors (see, for instance, Brekke, Konow, & Nyborg, 2017). Power is a many-
faceted term, but for any interpretation of the concept its distribution is of paramount
importance to the outcome of a urban development with multiple actors (Leengoed,
Blokhuis, Schaefer, Vries, & Snijders, 2008).
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Development and cooperation experiments
Cooperation amongst developers and between developers and public authorities is not
much studied using behavioural economics. The most important theoretical underpin-
ning for this topic is Measuring and Comparing Planning Cultures: Risk, Trust and Co-
operative Attitudes (Li et al., 2019). Here, the authors use economic experiments in an
urban development context, to quantify certain cultural diﬀerences between Belgium, the
Netherlands and Norway. The sample they use is small, making it hard to draw very wide
conclusions, but it illustrates the potential of economic game experiments to learn about
the subtle traits that inﬂuence people when they make decisions.
Glumac et al. (2016) combines a game experiment with several choice experiments to
analyse the negotiation process between municipalities and developers. Using this
complex methodology, they develop a model giving concrete advice for municipalities
on what sort of developers they ought to cooperate with, and what type of agreements
they ought to push for in a brownﬁeld area with a given set of attributes. This level of
concreteness is relatively rare in behavioural economics that tend to preface any advice
with a long list of reservations.
Methods
To study factors that might inﬂuence the provision of public goods, this paper uses
a public good experiment in which subjects can chose to contribute points to a common
pool or keep them for themselves. Changing the speciﬁc conditions of the experiments
and observing the changes in contributions to the common pool reveal some factors that
help or hinder cooperation between diﬀerent actors in urban development. These experi-
ments are modelled after Ledyard’s (1994) public goods game. These games are often set
in a setting that mimics an aspect of the topic of study to increase external validity. This
game therefore poses the game as an urban development scenario. For practical reasons,
the subjects does not play against each other, but the instructions tell them to imagine
that they play the game against other people. Such hypothetical games are frequently used
in experimental psychology, although games against actual opponents are preferable if
possible (Schroeder, Nettle, & McElreath, 2015).
Experimental design
The experiment is as follows: Three players are constructing one block of apartments each,
bordering a common area. Each player starts with a hundred points. They then decide
independently to contribute any share of these points, from 0 to 100, to a common
investment pool for improving the quality of the common area. This pool is doubled,
representing the sum of the added sales value of all three blocks. The players share the
beneﬁt of the investment, in the form of greater sales values, evenly between themselves
independently of their contributions. In other words, the result for each player is two thirds
the sum of all contributions, plus whatever they withhold from the common pool. As in
Ledyard’s game, the Nash equilibrium is for each player to contribute nothing, as con-
tributing anything without any way of making the others contribute something will reduce
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their payoﬀ. However, the solution of no one contributing anything is worse for everyone
than everyone contributing.
The experiments were carried out at planning- and development conferences in Norway
in 2017 and 2018. As opposed to most economic experiments which use students for their
readily availability, the subjects here were developers, public planners, consultants, and
others with employment ties to urban development. A breakdown of the number of
subjects in each of these employment cohorts are in Table 2. The subjects were not paid:
Payment would hardly enhance the realism as decision makers in the situations the
experiment mimics would only indirectly beneﬁt from the decision. Furthermore, most
studies on the subjects indicate that there is usually no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
monetary and hypothetical payoﬀs (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999), alternatively that experi-
menters should ‘pay enough or don’t pay at all’ which would be prohibitively diﬃcult with
the at least moderately well-paid subject pool (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000).
Results from consultants and other professionals from ﬁelds related to development
from the private and public sectors are included to provide information about the
environments in which developers and planners operate. To what extent these people
inﬂuence the development process will depend entirely on their speciﬁc background
and the project’s organisation. In other words, the ﬁndings for these cohorts are of
secondary importance to cooperation between developers and planners.
The instructions tell the subjects to imagine playing with two others from two diﬀerent
employment cohorts: developers, public planners, or one of each. This latter option is
only used if the player is in the private sector. This gives two diﬀerent treatments for both
of the two groups:
● A public employee playing with two developers (henceforth labelled MPP).1
● A private-sector employee playing with two developers (PPP).
● A public employee playing with two municipal planners (MMM).
● A private-sector employee playing with one developer and one municipal planner,
(PPM).
The MPP and PPM treatments mimic the typical Norwegian model of urban redevelop-
ment. Multiple independent developers and a public planning authority work alongside
each other, all with an interest in creating a good urban environment but not particularly
coordinated. However, the public player does not have any power to coordinate or force
cooperation from the others, as unlike the situation the game emulates. The PPP treatment
represents a situation with less government intervention. Lastly, the MMM treatment
mimics a situation where diﬀerent public entities, such as the road authority, public mass
transit companies, and environmental agencies are involved in the development of the
same area. These entities can have just as conﬂicting interests as private developers have
with the planning authorities, so cordial cooperative environments are important (Desfor &
Jørgensen, 2004).
The experiments use these two treatments to see whether the contributions diﬀer
depending on with whom players think they are playing. From a payoﬀ-maximising point
of view, who a person plays with should not matter for whether one contributes, as a player
will get most points by contributing zero in any case. Yet the aforementioned ‘warm glow’
eﬀectmight inﬂuence the players to a diﬀerent extent based on inwhich employment cohort
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the other players are. If players think that people from a certain employment cohort are
more prone to contribute, most of them will in turn contribute more (and vice versa)
(Wade-Benzoni, Tenbrunsel, & Bazerman, 1996).
All subjects play game one as described above. Out of the 269 subjects, 241 then play
a second round of the game, with one of two minor alterations to the rule. Table 1
summarises all these diﬀerent treatments and what they test, while Table 2 details the number
of subjects playing each game. Game 2 introduces an uncertainty element in the second
round: The subjects are told that upon completing the construction project themarket will be
either strong or weak. If the marked is strong, the contributed pool is tripled rather than
doubled. If it is weak, it is simply divided out to the players without being doubled. Modelled
after the thought experiment in Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms (Ellsberg, 1961), half
of the subjects are told the chance of either market is 50%, while the other half are just
informed of the possibility of a weak or strong market. In other words, the ﬁrst group is
dealing with a risk element, and should be better able to calculate the expected returns of their
investments, as they have a concrete chance with which to operate. The second group is
dealing with ambiguity, or unknown probabilities, although they can imagine the chance of
the two outcomes being normally distributed around 50–50: with no information on the risk
distribution, the odds of a strong market could be anywhere from zero to 100%, which
averages out to 50%. In either case, the expected returns for contributing to the common pool
is the same as in the base game, with each subject losing on average 1 point per three points
contributed. As developers cite uncertainty and risk as signiﬁcant barriers to development
investments (Farris, 2001), this should hamper contributions to the public good. Ellsberg’s
ﬁndings indicate that the ambiguous treatment, in which the subjects do not know the
distribution of positive and negative outcomes, is less appealing to subjects than knowing for
a fact there is a 50–50 chance. A total of 87 subjects receive this treatment, all from the private
pool as market risk is mostly relevant in private development.
Game three address heterogeneous endowments, played by 161 subjects. The subjects
were told they start with either a large endowment of 200 or a small endowment of 50
points, and that they are playing in groups where two players start with 50 points and one
200. This game mirrors that some developers and municipalities have roomier budgets and
stronger ﬁnancial resources to provide public goods than others do.
After the games, the subjects ﬁlled in a one-page questionnaire about their demographic
and professional background. The questionnaire also asked to what degree they agree with
the following statements: ‘Is lack of cooperation between private developers a problem for
urban transformation?’ and ‘Is lack of cooperation between private developers and muni-
cipalities is a problem for urban transformation?’
Table 1. A summary of the traits the paper studies, and which game element tests them.
Trait Game element
Propensity for cooperation in diﬀerent
employment cohorts
Normal public goods game
Importance of sector heterogeneity of players in
groups for propensity to cooperate
Some players play with opponents from the same sector, others
play with people from diﬀerent sectors
Importance of risk and uncertainty for propensity
to cooperate
Players are told there is a chance for a greater or smaller payoﬀ
from the common pool. Some players are told the risk
distribution, others are not.
Importance of heterogeneity of endowments in
groups for propensity to cooperate
Some people are told they have fewer points to contribute than
their opponents do, while others are told they have more.
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Findings
This section looks at the ﬁndings of the diﬀerent treatments described above, and the more
important ﬁndings from the survey. Generally, the average contributions of 60, 1% for the
base game were quite high when compared to similar experiments, where the contributions
typically range from 40% to 60% (Ledyard, 1994; Ostrom, 2000). Only eight of 269 subjects
(3 %) chose the point-maximising strategy of contributing zero.
Employment sector heterogeneity
Game one displays variations in contribution stemming from heterogeneity in the employ-
ment background of the groupmembers. For the sample as awhole, and for each employment
cohort, contributions are smaller from subjects in heterogeneous groups.When told they play
with people from other sectors average contributions were lower than when playing with
people from the same sector. This ﬁts well with previous studies regarding contributions in
heterogeneous groups. This eﬀect is particularly strong for members from the public sector,
who contribute on average 13% less when told they play with members from the private
sector, and consultants, who contributed 19% less with opponents from the public sector.
Only 18% of public planners gave more than the median contribution of 60 in the MPP
groups, while 51% gave more than this in the MMM groups. Interestingly, this eﬀect exists
predominantly among females, as previously found by Brown-Kruse and Hummels (1993).
Balliet et al (2011) summarises a long line of literature on gender diﬀerences for cooperation in
that the genders are in general equally cooperative, but react to diﬀerent treatments in diﬀerent
ways. For instance, all-female groups are less cooperative than all-male groups, while females
are more cooperative in mixed groups.
Contributions by employment cohort
Game one also displays the general willingness to contribute to public goods. Looking at the
average contributions in each sector there appears to be some diﬀerences between the sectors,
with consultants and public planners contributing the most on average, followed by other
public, then other private, and lastly private developers. Upon closer inspection, however,
virtually all of this stems from uneven distribution of the heterogeneous and homogenous
treatments: In some of the employment cohorts, more subjects were playing in heterogeneous
groups, which reduces the average contributions of all subjects in that cohort. After
normalising2 the average results within each employment cohort based on the distribution
of people playingwith players from the sameor diﬀerent cohort, there is virtually nodiﬀerence
between the average contributions of developers (57.0), consultants (60.7) other private (58.6),
and municipal planners (59.7). The ‘other public’-cohort contributed a weighted average of
50.9, an anomaly caused by only eight subjects receiving the heterogeneous treatment.
Risk
Game 2 introduces uncertainty: The subjects who played a second round with a chance of
triple payment from the common pool and a chance of no additional beneﬁt contributed on
average 18% less than in the normal version of the game. When facing risk 49% (46
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subjects) reduced their contributions, while 12% (11 subjects) increased them. These trends
were somewhat stronger for developers. The average drop was 15% under the ambiguity
treatment and 14% in the risk treatment. The players who knew the distribution of high and
low payoﬀs did not contribute more relative to their earlier contributions, than the players
who only knew that there was a chance for either.
Endowments
The games with diﬀerent levels of endowments displayed that heterogeneous endowments
lead to the participants contributing 5% fewer of the available points. Among the subjects
with large endowments, 50% (35 subjects) contributed a smaller share of their 200 points
than they contributed when everyone started with 100, but 59% (41 subjects) contributed
more when looking at the absolute numbers. Forty percent of the less endowed increased
their contribution in relative terms. Thirty percent of the subjects with 200 points gave
exactly 50 points.
Survey results
In the questionnaire that followed the games, most subjects reported a lack of cooperation
between the municipalities and private developers to be a problem: only 8 out of the 269
subjects who answered, disagreed with the statement ‘lack of cooperation between private
developers and municipalities is a problem for urban transformation’. How strongly subjects
agreed with this statement seemed to be a good indicator of contributions in cross-sector
cooperation: 68 subjects played games across sectors, either public workers playing with two
developers or private employees playing with one developer and one public planner. Out of
these, those who ‘strongly agreed’ contributed 23%more than those who simply ‘agreed’with
the statement did. The trend is the same for each employment cohort. ‘Noopinion’, ‘disagree’,
and ‘strongly disagree’ were also options, but only four subjects in the heterogeneous groups
chose these. Subjects were also asked if they agreed that lack of cooperation between private
developers was a problem for redevelopment, but there was no clear relationship between the
level of agreement with this and contributions in the games.
Discussion
The ﬁndings support the three hypotheses in the introduction:
● Almost all subjects are inclined to cooperate in a hypothetical development setting,
even when it is individually suboptimal and payoﬀs are uncertain.
● Average contributions are lower in most groups when faced with heterogeneity of
employment backgrounds.
● Average contributions are lower when faced with heterogeneous power levels within the
group, but worse-oﬀ subjects contribute a larger share thanwhen everyone has the same.
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Employment sector heterogeneity
In most countries, planning and spatial development requires the municipal planning autho-
rities, other public entities, and private developers to work together. For this to happen
eﬃciently, there ought to be a goodworking environment between these groups. The ﬁndings
indicate that there are some negative biases and poor social relations to the private sector
among Norwegian public planners. The experimental methods used in this paper would be
a viable way to test potential policies to alleviate this. For instance face-to-face interactions as
opposed to electronic communication could lead to better results in the game, which would
indicate that municipalities should employ it more frequently in real-life negotiations.
Developers as a cohort do only exhibit a weak preference for cooperation with other
developers, unlike the other employment cohorts studied here and most previous studies
on heterogeneous and homogenous groups. This is a minor strengthening of the notion of
there being a certain culture of reluctance towards cooperation between private developers,
although there does not seem to be any particular negative bias against other developers.3
Employment cohorts
Average contributions among all groups (60.1) were on the high end of the normal range of
comparable experiments using other settings and subjects. The data do not support any claim
that some individuals in the development process are more communally minded, while some
are more calculating.
Risk
Development, and particularly urban transformation and housing development, is risky busi-
ness. The 18%dip in contributions after introducing a risk element to the payoﬀ strengthens the
hypothesis that developers are reluctant to engage in cooperation in an uncertain environment.
The ﬁndings indicate that risk for instance stemming from volatile housing markets and
uncertainty about public regulation will make developers less likely to resort to cooperation,
evenwhere the expected returns from theproject are sustainable. This is the same for developers
in particular and for the sample as a whole. As much uncertainty and risk in private develop-
ment stems from themunicipalities altering the project boundaries late in the process (Nordahl
et al., 2008), these ﬁndings argue for greater predictability in public planning policy.
One way developers mitigate risk is to cooperate in joint ventures, as this makes them
less dependent on any one project. The ﬁndings could indicate that risk stemming from
limited knowledge about prospective partners makes this type of cooperation less likely to
happen: A developer starting cooperating with another developer stand to lose much not
only if the partner is actively dishonest, but also if they are incompetent or get into ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. A person might very well be willing to trust another, but still reluctant to enter
cooperation with them, if it increases the project’s riskiness.
Contrary to what Ellsberg (1961) found, ambiguity in the payoﬀ structure from the
common pool was not less appreciated than risk. It is plausible that more subjects assume
the odds of a strong or weakmarked were evenly distributed without being informed about it.
Furthermore, previous studies have indicated that subjects are more positive towards ambig-
uous uncertainty in gameswhere they feel they have some expertise, even if the expertise is not
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relevant for the outcome of the game (Dimmock, Kouwenberg, &Wakker, 2015). More than
half of the subjects (147 of 269) reports having 10 or more years of experience with develop-
ment or related ﬁelds, which can lead to over-conﬁdence when facing ambiguity.
Endowments
There is a small drop in average contributions when the players no longer have homogeneous
endowments. Quite many well-endowed subjects are unwilling to contribute more than they
know the others are able to. This implies that actors who are not in a position to contribute to
public goods are deterrent, presumably because players are wary of free riders. Most develop-
ment projects, and virtually any redevelopment project, will create public goods for surround-
ing landowners whose plots become more attractive. Usually these will not be in a position to
reciprocate: if they are not using the land for residential purposes or planning to develop them
as such, they might not recognise these changes as positive at all. The data indicate that the
existence of such unwitting free riders is occasionally detrimental to cooperation in develop-
ment, which makes cooperation more diﬃcult in areas with many landowners and interest
spheres. Also, quite many subjects employ a heuristic that when they are in a strong position,
they contribute as much as they can hope the weaker parties will contribute but nothing more.
A policy implication of this could be that the municipality ought to shift the infrastructure
burden further towards what each project is able to carry, as opposed to what the developers
with the most proﬁtable projects think is fair: In Norway, these costs are often divided
according to the size of the projects, not the proﬁtability, which beneﬁts the latter developers
who sell in an area that is already largely developed. On the other hand, developers’ perception
of fairness should also be relevant for the cost distribution, although that is outside the scope of
this study. Table 3 below summarises these ﬁndings.
Table 3. A summary of the ﬁndings.
Trait Game element Findings Interpretation
Propensity for
cooperation in
diﬀerent
employment
cohorts
Contributions in normal
public goods games
Contributions are quite high
compared to previous
studies.
There is something else than
pure proﬁt-maximization
that makes people want to
cooperate.
Importance of
heterogeneity of
players in groups
for propensity to
cooperate
Some players play with
opponents from the same
sector, others play with
people from diﬀerent
sectors
Planners and consultants
contribute less when they
play with people from
other sectors. Developers
contribute the same.
There are certain negative
biases amongst planners
against developers, and
amongst consultants
against planners.
Importance of risk
and uncertainty
for propensity to
cooperate
Players are told there is a
chance for a greater or
smaller payoﬀ from the
common pool. Some
players are told the risk
distribution, others are not.
Risk and uncertainty about
payoﬀs both reduces
willingness to contribute to
public goods.
People are more likely to
cooperate in predictable
environments.
Importance of
endowment
heterogeneity in
groups for
propensity to
cooperate
Some people are told they
have fewer points to
contribute than their
opponents, while others are
told they have more.
Players with small
endowments contribute a
larger share while players
with large endowments
contribute a smaller share
than if everyone has the
same.
Knowing some actors are
beneﬁtting from a public
good without contributing
in kind makes it less
appealing to contribute to
the good, even when these
actors are unable to
contribute.
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In countries where power shifts from the public to the private, it is reasonable to worry
about the state of public goods in the urban fabric, and whether developers will try to
freeride to the best of their abilities by only providing the bare necessity for meeting
municipal demands. In a system where the developers have much inﬂuence on what gets
built while public planners mostly inﬂuence the cityscape through giving or denying
building permits, good relationships between planners and developers give can give the
planners back some creative inﬂuence, while also making the application process easier for
developers (Peiser, 1990). Of course, cooperation giving more power to developers and
planners might remove power from other groups such as neighbour organisations and
NGOs. As custodians of the balance between the diﬀerent interests, municipalities must as
always ensure that power is not shifted too far: A wealth of literature on regime theory
describes how an alliance of developers and planners can marginalise other groups with
interests in the city (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001).
Relevance outside Norway
Unlike most other countries, developers in Norway forward the detailed zoning plans,
giving them a larger role in shaping the cities. However, the dynamics between public actors
(Nelson, 2001), between the developer and the planner, and between developers, is relevant
in any market economy (Van Meerkerk, Boonstra, & Edelenbos, 2013). Many countries
where planning and visions for the urban environment is almost or completely exclusive to
municipalities, are looking to shift more planning responsibility over to developers (Sager,
2011). This can be to gain an edge in the global competition between cities, reduce public
expenses, or increase market investments in urban development.
Previous studies using similar experiments (see, for instance, Herrmann, Thöni, &
Gächter, 2008), reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between countries in contributions and to
what extent subjects react to diﬀerent treatments. Also, Norwegian society is charac-
terised by a high degree of trust and cooperation between people and between the
public and private sectors, when compared to other European countries (EVS, 2008).
One might ﬁnd the many of the same trends in other countries, but should expect
variations.
Conclusions
Developers, planners, and other actors in the development process do not make coopera-
tion decisions from pure cost-beneﬁt analysis. Heuristics such as uncertainty avoidance,
preference for homogenous groups, and aversion to perceived unfairness can all become
barriers to eﬃcient cooperation.
The survey reveals that the subjects overwhelmingly agree on the premise of the paper,
the importance of cooperation between developers and municipalities. They also mostly
agree on the importance of cooperation amongst developers. The goals of these actors can
be overlapping or conﬂicting, and it poses a problem if they are unable to identify which is
which. Both developers and the planning authority will have an interest in making projects
that are good for the end users (for any given deﬁnition of ‘good’). However, the developers
have less incentive to make projects that are good for the rest of the city. Furthermore, they
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also have a strong incentive to use their economic and spatial resources eﬀectively, which
might put them at odds with other developers and planners.
In all sector cohorts and under all treatments, the average contributions were quite high
compared to similar experiments, and only eight subjects (3%) chose the point-maximising
strategy of contributing nothing. This implies that most subjects are prone to cooperation.
However, the experiments are able to identify uncertainty of payoﬀs as a barrier to
contributions to the public good in this particular setting. Heterogeneity in group composi-
tion or endowments is also problematic. Particularly people from the public sector con-
tribute much less on average when told they are playing developers: public planners have
a (deserved or undeserved) negative view of developers, which can make cooperation
between these groups more diﬃcult. Developers, planners, and others who want to foster
Pareto eﬃcient cooperation in development should keep inmind that potential partners will
be vary of risks, and will prefer to cooperate with others who have similar backgrounds and
ﬁnancial opportunity spaces. Beyond this, more researches are needed to oﬀer concrete
advice onwhat types of cooperationwould bemost beneﬁcial, and howbest to implement it.
The experiments used in this paper are able to indicate some such biases as being
relevant for a subject group’s propensity for cooperation. We should therefore consider
similar methods as potentially viable venues for identifying problematic biases in urban
development decision-making, and for testing hypotheses. It should also be considered
when evaluating possible policies for improving private-sector contributions to public
goods. This could be done as simply as translating a suggested policy into a game element,
and see whether it alters contributions.
Themethod, however, carries some limitations. These experiments would not generally be
able to falsify a hypothesis: The lack of a trend between a factor as operationalised in a game
and contributions in that game does not necessarily mean that this factor does not inﬂuence
the likelihood of successful cooperation projects. Firstly, a game mechanismmight be unable
to operationalise the real-world bias it intends to elicit. Secondly, the bias in question might
inﬂuence game contributions diﬀerently than it inﬂuences propensity for cooperation. If these
two issues are kept in mind, ﬁnding no or a weak trend would nevertheless imply that the
investigated bias is not important for a group’s propensity to cooperate.
Notes
1. The M stands for Municipal as Municipal planners are the primary group of focus,
although some M players are from other public bodies.
2. This normalisation is simply the average value of the two treatments (PPP and PPM or
MMM and MPP) within each employment cohort (planners, developers and so on).
3. Consultants do not share the developers’ disregard of group heterogeneity and contribute
a lot less if they are told they are playing with public planners than with developers. It is
hard to pinpoint whether this is important, as consultants’ inﬂuence over the decision
making in a project will vary a lot from organisation to organisation.
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